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ABSTRACT: The paper aims at the rehabilitation of deductive reasoning. As a paradigm of reliable reason-
ing, it should be applicable in every confirmation context. In particular, it should transmit inductive justifica-
tion, so that if D justifies a hypothesis H, then D also justifies all deductive conclusions from H. Nevertheless, 
most current philosophers of science reject such a transmission principle as false. They argue against it by pro-
viding apparent counter-examples and also by showing that it is incompatible with common confirmation the-
ories such as HD-confirmation and Bayesianism. I argue in the opposite direction that we should stick to the 
transmission principle and revise instead our justification theories towards more cautious justification proce-
dures that respect the transmission principle. This will avoid further paradoxes of these theories and, in par-
ticular, will enable us to apply our confirmed hypotheses to new situations in a well-founded way.
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RESUMEN: El artículo tiene como propósito rehabilitar el razonamiento deductivo. Como paradigma de razo-
namiento fiable, el razonamiento deductivo debería poder aplicarse en todo contexto de confirmación. En particu-
lar, debería transmitir la justificación inductiva, de modo que si D justifica una hipótesis H, entonces D también 
justifique todas las implicaciones deductivas de H. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los filósofos de la ciencia actuales re-
chazan este principio de transmisión, planteando contraejemplos y mostrando su incompatibilidad con teorías co-
munes de la confirmación, como la confirmación Hipotético-Deductiva y el bayesianismo. En contra de esta ten-
dencia, argumento que deberíamos preservar el principio de transmisión, y revisar en cambio nuestras teorías de la 
justificación para trabajar con procedimientos de justificación más cautelosos que respeten el principio de transmi-
sión. Haciendo esto evitaremos paradojas de las teorías ordinarias de la justificación y, en particular, estaremos en 
posición de aplicar nuestras hipótesis confirmadas a nuevas situaciones de manera fundamentada.
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1. Introduction
Deductive reasoning is a paradigm of good reasoning and should, therefore, be accepted in 
any form of reasoning and inference. Unfortunately, most contemporary philosophers as-
sume that it is not generally applicable at a central point, namely in the transmission of in-
ductive justification of our beliefs. This shows, in my opinion, that the existing conceptions 
of justification are inappropriate. We should modify them in such a way that they transmit 
justification and no longer produce transmission errors. This is a prerequisite for applying 
our well-founded beliefs and our scientific knowledge to new situations. I make a proposal 
how this modification of inductive justification might be done and show that it can solve 
further problems of inductive inference.
2. A Central Requirement for Confirmation Theories
The Transmission Principle (TP) claims that the deductive consequences of a justified be-
lief are also justified. In particular, we want to assure that if evidence D (incrementally) 
confirms a theory X then D also confirms every deductive consequence Y of X. This is the 
TP I want to argue for.
The Transmission Principle (TP): From (D K X) and (X ⇒ Y) follows: D K Y
That is to say: if D (for the subject S) confirms the statement X (relative to his back-
ground knowledge K) and Y is entailed (logically) by X (and S knows this connection), 
then D also confirms Y inductively (relative to K for S). For simplicity, we always assume 
that D, X, and Y are contingent statements, and, I think, the principle works for dif-
ferent explications of logical entailment represented by the double arrow and different 
forms of confirmation.
If the evidence D is strong enough to increase S’s degree of justification for X to an ex-
tent that she accepts X, and she knows that X entails Y, then TP requires that D also in-
creases S’s degree of justification for Y to an extent that she also accepts Y. Of course, the 
TP can have further implications for the deductive closure of knowledge, depending on 
what one understands by justification in the concept of knowledge, but I will not pursue 
these additional questions here. In particular, I do not want to deal with complicated cases 
of “easy knowledge” in which we establish some of our meta-beliefs in a circular way (cf. 
Neta, 2013). My aim is only to specify a requirement for simple empirical confirmations in 
order to find the most adequate confirmation conception. Since incremental confirmation 
is the basis of absolute justification and acceptance of hypothesis, it seems to be a good idea 
to focus on this type of confirmation. Bayesians also have another concept of absolute con-
firmation, which is discussed in section 7.
Although we can often decide easily whether or not certain data D confirm a theory T, 
it remains difficult to develop a precise confirmation theory. The most popular candidate 
for such a theory among philosophers is currently Bayesian (incremental) confirmation, 
which holds that D incrementally confirms T iff P(T|D) > P(T). However, if Bayesianism 
wants to explicate an objective concept of confirmation, it can eventually only reconstruct 
which logical or inferential relations have to exist between D and T (and our background 
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knowledge) for D to justify T (cf. Hawthorne, 2005). And therefore, we should first ex-
plore these basic confirmatory relationships.
To improve our theories of (inductive) confirmation, I would like to revive an idea from 
Hempel (1965) and argue for the transmission principle that Hempel has called the special 
consequence condition and regarded as a mandatory requirement for every confirmation con-
ception. Unfortunately, many philosophers (as e.g. Wright 2003, Sober 2015) believe that the 
principle is wrong, because on the one hand, there seem to be transmission errors and, on the 
other hand, many confirmation theories are incompatible with the principle. This is, for in-
stance, the case for the hypothetico-deductive confirmation account as well as for (incremen-
tal) Bayesianism. Hence, if we want to stick to the transmission principle, we have to modify 
these approaches, and, after all, move to more cautious forms of inference and confirmation. 
With a more cautious form of induction we can on the one hand comply with the transmis-
sion principle and on the other hand solve further problems like the tacking paradox.
The following short anecdote may illustrate a basic problem of inductive inference. An 
empiricist, a physicist, and a journalist travel to France and see just across the border three 
brown cows. The journalist says: “Look, in France the cows are brown.” The physicist re-
plies: “Be more cautious, we can only say that in France there are three brown cows.” And 
the empiricist is even more cautious: “We can only say: in France, there are three objects 
that look from afar like cows and brown from one side.”
Who of them is the best scientist? That depends on the particular situation and fur-
ther background knowledge, and cannot be answered in general. The empiricist will never 
get deeper insights into the world with his very cautious inference strategy. He remains with 
the data but will not commit inductive errors. Thus, he advises us to use the strict cautious 
strategy: Do not go beyond what we can actually prove on the basis of our data. The jour-
nalist, on the other side, tries to draw much stronger conclusions about other situations 
with his bold generalization strategy. Both strategies pursue certain aims of science and we 
cannot tell easily how a good compromise should look like. These inference strategies cor-
respond to certain conceptions of confirmation. We can ask which of the three conclusions 
is genuinely confirmed or justified by the observation. I propose, that the best confirmation 
theory should, at least, avoid the tacking paradox (or irrelevant conjunction problem) and 
subscribe to the transmission principle.
3. Why we need the Transmission Principle
First, I want to explain how I will use some of the basic concepts, such as “confirmation” 
and “justification”, and explain some general epistemological assumptions that I will pre-
suppose in the following. I will always use “confirmation” in the sense of incremental con-
firmation. Evidence E (incrementally) confirms hypothesis H if E supports H or tells in fa-
vor of hypothesis H or makes H more probable than it is without E. In many cases that is 
not enough for an absolute confirmation of H or a justification of a belief in H.
Nevertheless, (incremental) confirmation and (absolute) epistemic justification are 
closely related. In general, we are justified to hold a belief if the evidence confirming it is 
strong enough and there are no pieces of evidence disconfirming it or if they are negligible. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make these intuitions more precise in general since some 
pieces of evidence supporting a particular assumption may even be undermined by fur-
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ther evidence and thereby lose their supporting function. For example, John tells me that 
p, which perhaps justifies my belief in p, but Susan tells me that John is a liar, undermining 
my evidence for p, and then James claims that Susan is the real liar, which perhaps rehabil-
itates my justification for p and so forth. And there are other complications that show that 
(absolute) justification is a more holistic concept and has to be based on our total evidence 
(Kelly, 2014). In the empirical sciences we can find cases in which E confirms and justifies 
H and we later invent a new hypothesis H* that can explain E better than H and, there-
fore, E then speaks more in favor of H* than of H and no longer supports H strong enough 
for the justification of H. But, justification or absolute confirmation is not my main topic 
here. I will concentrate instead on the simpler concept of incremental confirmation.
Evidence is determined functionally as “the kind of thing which can make a difference 
to what one is justified in believing or (what is often, but not always, taken to be the same 
thing) what it is reasonable for one to believe.” (Kelly, 2014). Sometimes I will also speak 
of data as confirming a hypothesis. In any case, I presuppose a moderate form of evidential-
ism, in which the justification to believe or accept an assumption A must in some way be 
based on our evidence and especially on the evidence that confirms A.
In many simple cases (without further disconfirming or undermining evidence) a 
(strongly) confirming evidence E will already be sufficient to justify a hypothesis H. In 
these cases the transmission principle has to guarantee that we are also justified to believe 
any deductive consequences of H. The counterexamples to the TP that we discuss in sec-
tion 6 may serve as concrete examples in which the transmission of justification fails, and 
that seems to be a problem for our confirmation theory.12The bad effects of transmission 
failures of confirmations are often particularly visible in those cases in which an incremen-
tal confirmation alone provides an absolute confirmation or justification of a belief.
Our justified beliefs should guide our evaluation of further statements and, of course, 
our (rational) choices. But that couldn’t work if confirmation and justification is not trans-
mitted by deductive inferences. Only the TP allows us to apply our beliefs to new cases and 
usually we will not hesitate to rely on certain logical entailments of our well-founded be-
liefs. At least, it seems very natural that we can rely on a weaker claim W if we even can al-
ready rely on the stronger claim B.
Let’s have a look at some simple examples. If my evidence provides some confirma-
tion for the belief that there is a red table in front of me, then this evidence also provides 
at least the same degree of confirmation to the assumption that there is a table in front 
of me. Of course, few will want to deny that. Or imagine that we argue with the landlord 
about whether the contractually guaranteed minimum temperature of 20° C is reached in 
our apartment. He points out that the very reliable thermometer in the apartment points 
at 23° C (D). That supports the claim (X) that the temperature in the apartment is 23° C. 
Thus, he says, that he has fulfilled his part of the contract. But, now we argue that we re-
gard D and X as well founded but not (Y) that we have more than 20° C in the apartment, 
since that would follow only by applying TP to D and X and we reject TP. Therefore, we 
argue that he has to produce another justification for Y. He will hardly understand what 
we want him to do.
1 I discuss the Bayesian distinction between incremental and absolute confirmation in section  7. For 
Bayesians the transmission of absolute confirmation is guaranteed due to the rules of probability.
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In science we need the transmission of justification as well, at least if we want to ap-
ply our scientific knowledge. Certain Data D may increase our justification for theory (X) 
that an antibiotic A normally cures a disease K. With TP, there would be at least the same 
increase in our justification for the entailed claim (Y) that Joe, who has K, will probably be 
cured if he takes A. But, if TP fails, it will be very difficult to utilize our theory X. Deductive 
inference is usually the strongest form of inference we are equipped with. If it doesn’t suffice 
to transmit justification and transport our knowledge, we cannot in general draw any jus-
tified consequences from our justified theories. Without TP, the physician cannot tell Joe 
that D supports believing Y. Therefore, Joe would have no reason to take antibiotic A.
This seems strange to me and I would interpret such a situation as indicating that our 
conception of justification as non-transmitting has an obvious deficit. Of course, inductive 
reasoning provides no truth guarantee. Even if A cures K in general it may not be successful 
in the special case of Joe, but at least D should provide some prima facie support for Y and 
thus for the recommendation that Joe should take A.
Can we, therefore, think of forms of confirmation and justification that are compatible 
with TP? In any case, we should give cautious confirmation a try; especially, since our exist-
ing theories of confirmation seem to have further deficits.
4. The Co-Confirmation Problem and Cautious Induction
If we want to confirm and eventually accept an empirical theory T, we have to compare T’s 
predictions with the data. To do this, we normally deduce an observable prediction D from 
T plus our background knowledge K and then check whether D indeed occurs. The best-
known account of such a comparison can be found in the hypothetico-deductive concep-
tion of theory confirmation.
HD-Confirmation: From (T∧K ⇒ D) and (not: K ⇒ D) and D follows: D K T.
Unfortunately, the tacking paradox (or co-confirmation problem as I would like to call it) is 
a serious problem for this approach as well as for the underlying idea, and it is one reason 
for modifying the HD-account of confirmation. From the monotony of deduction, we find 
for any arbitrary statement A:
Co-Confirmation: From T∧K ⇒ D follows A∧T∧K ⇒ D and also ¬A∧T∧K ⇒ D. 
According to the HD-approach, this would mean: D K (T∧A) and also D K (T∧¬A).
In this situation A and non-A would be co-confirmed by D, even though D need not have 
anything to do with A. Thus, we have to improve the HD-approach at this point so that D 
justifies only T and not A∧T as well.
Furthermore, T itself may already be a composition T = H∧T*, where H may be irrel-
evant for D, and we would again get a case of spurious co-confirmation with only T* to be 
genuinely confirmed by D.
Independence (Irrelevance) of H and D: If H∧T*∧K ⇒ D and also ¬H∧T*∧K ⇒ D 
and (not: H∧K ⇒  D) and (not: ¬H∧K ⇒ D) then H and D are independent relative to K.
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This form of irrelevance is a plausible indication that H is not genuinely confirmed by D 
in the HD-account. In order to make this explicit in our confirmation theory, some con-
ceptions of relevance logic have been developed (e.g. Schurz, 1991; Gemes, 1993; Sprenger, 
2010, 2013), which may help to solve the problem, but I am skeptical as to whether the 
problem can be solved completely at the syntactic level (see section 8). Thus, I prefer to dis-
cuss the intuitive underlying problem.
In any case, we need some restrictions in the definition of the HD-account. My infor-
mal proposal is that we always have to look for meaningful decompositions T = T1∧T2, 
where D is irrelevant for T2 (or even disconfirms T2), so that in fact only T1 is confirmed. 
Thus, if we find a decomposition in which T1 and T2 represent meaningful assertions and 
T2 is not confirmed by D, then we should say that only a part of T, but not T as a whole, is 
confirmed by D. This will become obvious in the case of inference to the best explanation. 
Typically, those parts T1 of T that are indispensable for an explanation of D are genuinely 
confirmed by D, whereas the conjunction T1∧T2 is only apparently confirmed. These 
ideas motivate my proposal for a cautious form of confirmation:
Cautious confirmation: If D confirms a theory T in the sense of some confirmation 
theory (such as the HD-confirmation or inference to the best explanation) and there is no 
meaningful decomposition of T into a conjunction T1∧T2 such that T2 is not confirmed 
by D (relative to K), then T is cautiously confirmed by D (relative to K).
This eventually leads us to the general conjunction condition, according to which a con-
junction A∧B is cautiously confirmed by D if and only if both A and B are confirmed by D:
Conjunction condition: D K A∧B iff (D K A and D K B).
The conjunction condition (Hempel, 1965) can serve as a first guideline for the explication 
of a conception of cautious confirmation that will respect the transmission principle. My 
thesis is that genuine confirmation always has to be cautious.23
5. The Principle of Theory Strengthening
Further motivation to work with a cautious form of confirmation is to avoid becoming 
committed to the principle of theory strengthening (called Converse Consequence con-
dition by Hempel), which is supported by most approaches to confirmation, and which is 
neither plausible nor compatible with the transmission principle. It says:
Theory Strengthening (TS): If D K X and Y ⇒ X then: D KY
2 In order to avoid possible confusion one of the reviewers proposed always to speak of “genuine” in-
stead of further introducing “cautious” confirmation, but I want to be more modest and only claim 
that cautiousness is a necessary condition for genuine confirmation. Nevertheless, genuine confirma-
tion may have further aspects as well that I will not address here.
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The principle TS seems to be far less plausible than TP, for why should D also support any 
stronger theory Y if we only know D to be sufficient to confirm the weaker theory X? In 
particular, it leads to the already described problem of co-confirmation of irrelevant con-
junctions.
Nevertheless, TS is a typical consequence of our confirmation accounts. If X entails 
D then, of course, the stronger Y entails D too. Thus, from HD-confirmation follows TS, 
and, since Bayesianism respects these logical relations, at least for data that are entailed by 
X we find the same problem for incremental Bayesian confirmation. Bayesians therefore 
have to deny TP. For example, Pitts (2013, p. 2119) says: “Another possible source of con-
fusion is the special consequence condition on confirmation, which Bayesians must re-
ject”. Some Bayesians hope to soften the impact of the tacking paradox by proposing that 
the stronger theory Y is less strongly confirmed by D than the weaker theory X (Crupi & 
Tentori, 2010). But, that depends on the special choice of a Bayesian confirmation measure 
(with respect to the likelihood ratio measure X and Y may be confirmed equally strong by 
D) and can at most be seen as a first weakening of the co-confirmation problem.
One problem with TS is that it is obviously incompatible with TP, since from D K X 
and TS follows D K X∧T with an arbitrary theory T, and, therefore, we get with TP: 
D K  T. Thus, D eventually confirms any theory T. This “anything-confirms-anything 
problem” is, of course, disastrous for any confirmation theory. However, as we have seen, the 
HD-confirmation and also incremental Bayesian confirmation are in their classical versions 
committed to TS, and even other approaches such as Likelihoodism or Classical Hypothesis 
Testing are affected in a similar way. In order to avoid the problem of confirming anything, 
we have to move on to more modest conceptions of confirmation that reject TS and fulfill 
the conjunction condition. These modifications are obviously necessary but not easy to im-
plement. In addition, some philosophers argue against TP with difficult examples.
6. Counterexamples to the Transmission Principle
Unfortunately, several apparent counterexamples against the TP have been discovered. 
The twin example is often referred to as such a case of transmission error (cf. Wright, 2003; 
Moretti & Piazza, 2013). It is about two identically looking twins Joe and Jim:
(Twins) Our observation D that someone before us looks like Joe justifies the assump-
tion (X) that Joe is standing in front of us. From X follows (not-Y) that Jim is not standing 
in front of us.
But, intuitively, D does not support not-Y because D speaks in the same way for the fact 
that Jim is standing in front of us as it does for the fact that it is Joe. This shows again that 
we should be more cautious in our inductive inferences. If we assume or discover that an 
identical twin of Joe exists, we should say that D only confirms “X or Y” (Joe or Jim is 
standing in front of us) and not the stronger assertion “(X or Y) and not-Y” = X, since we 
have no special clues for the second conjunct (not-Y). And with cautious induction we face 
no problem for TP.
The Zebra example is quite analogous. We see a four-legged, horse-like animal with 
black and white stripes before us (D). This justifies the assumption (X) that a zebra is 
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standing in front of us. From X we can infer (Y) that there is no mule with painted stripes 
in front of us. But this is not really substantiated by D if we know that the possibility of a 
perfectly painted mule with zebra optics is real. Then, we can cautiously justify only the 
corresponding disjunction: A zebra or a mule with painted stripes is in front of us (or more 
generally: a zebra-like-looking animal is standing in front of us). Inductive inference is, of 
course, always dependent on our further background knowledge, which tells us what other 
relevant possibilities we need to consider (cf. Bartelborth, 2004).
If our background knowledge is still incomplete or false and if we, at least, assume that 
no identically looking twin of Joe exists, then D seems to confirm the stronger statement 
X. This changes as soon as we seriously discuss whether D can also confirm that there is 
no such twin. Obviously, D cannot justify X as long as the possibility of an identical twin 
seems relevant. In this case, we have to formulate our inference more cautiously and have to 
consider all relevant alternatives that our background knowledge allows. For a genuine con-
firmation of X, we need evidence D that speaks clearly in favor of X in comparison with its 
relevant alternatives.
We can give a similar conjunctive analysis of Elliott Sober’s (2015) example, in which 
he likewise confirms only part of a conjunction, and where the transmission error arises be-
cause he mistakenly assumes that he has confirmed the complete conjunction. If one can 
spot in a game of cards that a certain card is red, this information D supports the assertion 
(X) that it is the Ace of Hearts (according to Sober), from which it follows (Y) that it is an 
Ace, but Y itself seems not to be genuinely confirmed by D.
A simple probabilistic analysis can help to reveal the problem in this case: For a deck of 
32 cards we find for instance: P(Heart ∧ Ace|red card) = P(Heart|red card) × P(Ace|red 
card) = 1/2*1/4 = 1/8 and P(Heart ∧ Ace|red card) = 1/16. In this case the information 
“D = the card is red” increases the probability of “Heart” but not the probability of “Ace” 
and the probability of “Heart ∧ Ace” is only increased by the first effect. Thus, we have, at 
most, a genuine incremental confirmation of the claim that the card is Hearts, but not of 
the claim that it is an Ace of Hearts. Perhaps only the claim “Heart or Diamond” is really 
confirmed. This is the idea of cautious confirmation.
The conjunctive analysis amounts to the following: In each case a statement H is di-
vided into two reasonably independent statements and we have confirmed just one of 
them, but not the other. Whether this is the case cannot always be determined by a logi-
cal-syntactic analysis alone, because the decomposability of H depends on which predicates 
and other expressive possibilities (including modal ones) and which additional background 
knowledge we have that specifies the set of relevant alternatives that we have to consider. 
Furthermore, it is often not easy to translate statements of natural language (e.g. condition-
als) into a logical language. Rather, it is about whether, in fact, H can be represented with-
out a loss of content by a conjunction “A and B” of two statements. Then we should say 
that H is genuinely confirmed if and only if A and B are both confirmed.
Achinstein (2003) has already given us some grounds to doubt that a probability in-
crease alone can provide a good explication of the confirmation relationship. According 
to Achinstein certain explanatory relationships have to be added. This is another form of a 
more cautious confirmation, and I would like to add that only those parts of our hypothe-
sis are genuinely confirmed that are indispensable for the required explanation.
A philosophical application of the transmission principle can be found in Moore’s fa-
mous proof of the outside world. Moore (1939) deduces from (X) “Here is a hand” the 
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realist proposition (Y) “There is an outside world”. This, however, does not seem to be a 
compelling refutation of the external world skepticism to most philosophers. Let us first 
have a look at how Moore could justify his statement X itself. Modern empiricists would 
presumably refer to seemings (or sense data) like (D) “It seems to me as if I perceive my 
hand before me” to justify X. If Moore, furthermore, wants to conclude that D also justifies 
Y he seems to commit a transmission error, since D does not support Y and, for most phi-
losophers, Moore, therefore, has no convincing argument against the skeptic.
The crucial question in Moore’s argumentation is whether D actually justifies X or per-
haps only a weaker proposition that allows some skeptical hypotheses to be true and avoids 
the transmission error. In a debate with a skeptic, we have to regard skeptical scenarios as 
a relevant possibility and can only justify a disjunction as for example “Here is my hand or 
I am hallucinating that I see my hand”, from which we cannot draw realist conclusions. A 
more cautious form of inference gives us the presumably genuinely confirmed conclusion.
The tacking paradox and the given counterexamples to TP are typical cases of trans-
mission failures. It seems obvious to me that they occur due to a violation of the conjunc-
tion condition. Furthermore, the conjunction condition seems to be a plausible require-
ment for confirmations, at least if we are aiming at the transmission principle, because in 
these cases we can see that only a certain identifiable part Y of our hypothesis X is con-
firmed, but not other parts of X. Thus, I believe we can easily agree to the conjunction con-
dition that can avoid these failures. Does the conjunction condition guarantee the TP? At 
least, it does so if we accept a trivial application: If X logically entails Y we can represent X 
in principle by the conjunction X  =  Y ∧ X and, therefore, according to the conjunction 
condition Y is confirmed by evidence E if E confirms X.
7. Bayesian Absolute Confirmation to the Rescue?
Bayesians distinguish between incremental and absolute confirmation. We find both no-
tions in many reviews on Bayesianism (e.g. Huber, 2007; Sprenger, 2016; Talbott, 2016). 
Incremental confirmation means an increase in probability and absolute confirmation re-
quires a high probability exceeding a certain threshold value k > 0.5. Therefore, “D con-
firms H” is explicated either by (1) P(H|D) > P(H) or by (2) P(H|D) > k.
Absolute confirmation has the great advantage that it can avoid the tacking paradox 
and that it is transmitted by deductions. A reviewer, therefore, has proposed that we should 
take it as the main conception of Bayesian confirmation and moreover as an easy solution 
of the mentioned problems.
Those Bayesians who place absolute confirmation at the center of their theory of con-
firmation can take TP to be a necessary characteristic of genuine confirmation. However, 
Bayesians in general don’t want to dismiss incremental confirmation and in many applica-
tions Bayesians only refer to confirmation as probability increase. For example, this is the 
case with Shogenji (2017), who investigates under which conditions confirmation is tran-
sitive, i.e., in which cases even inductive confirmation transmits confirmation, that means 
that x K y K z implies x K z. For this purpose, he proposes special probabilistic re-
quirements. In particular, we achieve transitivity if x supports or weakens z only indirectly 
through its impact on the mediating y. In a corresponding Bayesian Net there would be no 
direct path from x to z, on which x could directly support non-z.
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This result shows a close connection to my considerations. The conjunction condi-
tion can ensure this for the special case that y = y’∧ z (so that y logically entails z), because 
then x particularly confirms z and certainly not non-z. But the question of the transitivity 
of confirmation is more general and we cannot usually expect confirmation to be transitive. 
However, we have seen that we should demand that deductive conclusions always transmit 
confirmation.
In any case, for many Bayesians incremental confirmation is their main concept of con-
firmation (e.g. Bradley, 2015; Weisberg, 2011; Sprenger, 2016; Talbott, 2016). There are 
good reasons for this. First of all, it corresponds more closely to our intuitiv concept of con-
firmation, which I have discussed in section 3, whereas absolute confirmation (or confir-
mation as firmness) does not fit well with our intuitive idea of confirmation. Therefore, 
Sprenger (2016) points out: “This last point brings us to a particularly unintuitive conse-
quence of confirmation as firmness: E could confirm H even if it lowers the probability of 
H as long as p(H|E) is still large enough. But nobody would call an experiment where the 
results E are negatively statistically relevant to H a confirmation of H.” In this situation, it 
is not intuitive to say that D supports H or that D confirms H, but rather that D seems to 
speak against H and thus seems to disconfirm H.
Second, the incremental notion of confirmation corresponds to concepts of confirma-
tion from qualitative approaches such as H-D-confirmation. Outside of Bayesianism we 
have no clear criteria for an absolute confirmation. If we can deduce D from H and D oc-
curs, H is confirmed to some extent by D, but we have no indication in the approach itself 
how strongly H is supported altogether by D and our further background knowledge.
Third, the (evidentialist) idea that Bayesian degrees of belief should be determined pri-
marily by updating with (objective) evidence or data seems very plausible. This requires a 
conception of whether some data speak in favor of or against a hypothesis (i.e. raise or de-
crease the probability of the hypothesis), which is just what we want from a conception of 
(incremental) confirmation. So, at least one important explication of “D confirms H” in 
Bayesian epistemology is incremental confirmation. Thus, Bayesians can’t completely do 
without incremental confirmation (and, in any case, we keep the transmission problem for 
all forms of qualitative confirmation).
Finally, even a combination of both criteria (that could fix our first problem with abso-
lute confirmation) cannot help us. If we combine the conditions (1) and (2) for confirma-
tion, the absolute confirmation would be transmitted by deductive conclusions but not the 
increase of probability and thus confirmation again would not be transmitted.
8. Genuine inductive inference without transmission errors
At least one hard question remains: Is the conception of a cautious confirmation too re-
strictive? Can there be any genuine inductive inference from our data if our confirmation 
theory has to comply with the TP, or can the data D only cautiously confirm those parts of 
any hypothesis H that are logically entailed by the data D? I want to show that a cautious 
justification of scientific theories or generalizations is indeed possible. And, please keep in 
mind that we already know several other problems with our established confirmation ac-
counts that motivate similar modifications. There are paradoxes like the “grue” or the ra-
ven paradox and some further problems mentioned above. These problems, in any case, 
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give us a good reason to rethink inductive inference. Let’s start with a simple case of extrap-
olation.
If we examine three peaches and all of them have a stone, that supports the assumption 
that the next peach will once again have a stone, and it even confirms (incrementally) the 
general assumption that all peaches have a stone. For most types of fruit, we expect a cer-
tain degree of homogeneity with respect to stones, because this is an important factor for 
the reproductive mechanism of the corresponding plants. If we, however, consider Good-
manian generalizations with gruesome gerrymandered properties simple extrapolations 
can already lead to contradictory predictions. And even simpler examples can show that we 
should not extrapolate all patterns that can be found in our data.
We find a similar problem of lacking projectibility in inductive logic and in objec-
tive Bayesianism. Does the observation of an object b that is F increase the probability of 
another object a to be F? For Carnap’s (1950) original confirmation function c we find: 
c(Fa | Fb) = c(Fa|tautology). The function c did not exhibit a genuine induction property. 
Thus, it admitted no learning from experience and, therefore, Carnap developed the new 
function c* using special considerations about the structure of state descriptions.
Jon Williamson (2008) has discussed the analogous problem in the context of his 
objective Bayesianism, using the example of the hypothesis that all ravens are black. We 
would like to conclude from observed black ravens that also other ravens are probably 
black, but his Maxent update procedure doesn’t provide this connection:
To derive the problem it is assumed that initially there are no constraints, and that, once the 
ravens have been observed, there is a single constraint induced by the evidence. This overlooks 
important knowledge that is implicit in the language, namely that Ba1, ..., Bak are all related inas-
much as they are all applications of the same predicate. If this information is not taken into ac-
count then no connection between the observations can be made. (Williamson, 2008, p. 344)
However, the information that the instances are all instances of the same predicate is obvi-
ously too weak to vindicate the induction property.
If we construct unnatural predicates (or even grue-like predicates) we often get 
non-projectible generalizations as, e.g., U = “All objects with the letter e in their most com-
mon English nomination are mentioned in the works of Conan Doyle.” U may be true in 
many cases, but there is no substantial connection between the predicates (or properties) 
involved and, thus, we should not extrapolate to new cases if we have found some true in-
stances of U. A cautionary inference should not go beyond the data in such cases. We can 
construe a predicate F for every arbitrary set S of objects as “Fx iff x is Element of S”, how-
ever, we get thereby many unnatural “properties”, and we only expect sparse and natural 
properties to yield projectible generalizations.
In the debate about grue-like predicates we can even learn that we should not only differ-
entiate between projectible and non-projectible predicates, but have to select complete pro-
jectible generalizations (cf. Bradley 2015, chapters 7 & 8). Frank Jackson (1975) has given 
an example in which even the predicate grue can be used in projectible generalizations. Thus, 
we have to clarify and explain for entire generalizations which are genuinely projectible. This 
seems to be the central task in order to solve Goodman’s new problem of induction.
Subjective Bayesians, of course, can easily incorporate the induction property into 
their degrees of belief functions, but that does not answer the question of whether and 
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in what cases an extrapolation is justified. Inductive support for new unobserved cases 
may be nothing more than a “feeling of support”, namely one in which the equation 
P(Fa | Fb) > P(Fa| tautology) is correct, but this equation is maintained only as a subjective 
interpretation of the degrees of belief held by the epistemic subject, and we may have no 
objective clues to its validity. I am looking for a more objective grounding of the induction 
property.
Let’s consider a simple extrapolation: We want to confirm the generalization 
H = ∀x (Fx → Gx) by its instances. The generalization H can, e.g., be (H1) “when a piece 
of metal is heated, it expands” or (H2) “when someone has a certain type of pneumonia 
and receives an antibiotic A then he will recover within a few days.”
Usually, we will test H by examining objects of type F whether they are G too. The 
more F-objects we can find that are also G-objects the more strongly H should be con-
firmed. This fits the HD-conception of confirmation, because, if we have the background 
knowledge that a is F, then we can conclude from H that a must also be G. Unfortunately, 
we encounter a number of known difficulties even for this basic method of confirmation, 
such as the paradox of the raven, the grue-paradox, or simple instances that appear to be 
counterexamples to this idea of instance confirmation, such as the following: (H) “All hu-
mans are less than 2.40 meters”. If we now find several people who are 2.39 meters tall, this 
observation should confirm H. But, in fact, it seems to count against H, because these peo-
ple let us reasonably assume that soon there may be people who are taller than 2.40 meters. 
Our background knowledge tells us that there is always a certain variability in size with 
humans. If, therefore, some people have already reached a height of 2.39 m, then it is very 
probable that someday an offspring will occur that is 2 cm larger and thus refutes H. How-
ever, these counterexamples are very special cases, and in general we think a confirmation by 
positive instances should at least be possible.
But, the strategy of caution seems to threaten all these extrapolations. Let’s assume that 
there is a domain M of F-objects a1, a2, ..., (possibly finite) and that we have made the ob-
servation D that the first observed n of the F-objects are G. Then we can split H in M into 
a simple conjunction: H1-n = Ga1∧ ... ∧ Gan and H>n = ∀(i>n) (Gai). Our datum D coin-
cides with H1-n (within M) and therefore confirms exactly this part of H but does not seem 
to confirm the further part H>n. Popper has always expressed a corresponding suspicion. If 
this diagnosis is accurate, we would have lost any genuine induction and we are only talking 
about a deductive partial confirmation of the hypothesis or a form of content cutting as Ear-
man (1992, p. 98) has called it:
... the real question for inductivism is the one emphasized by Nelson Goodman in Fact, Fiction, 
and Forecast, namely, when do already observed instances confirm a hypothesis merely by content 
cutting (i.e. by entailing part of the content of the hypothesis) and when do they genuinely con-
firm it in the sense of the predictions about unexamined instances?
For a genuine confirmation of H the F-objects must be similar with respect to some ba-
sic properties that decide whether they are also G or not. At least, F and G have to be con-
nected in some way. One possible solution of Earmen’s problem may be that laws of nature 
are projectible, and, in addition, I think that many (lawlike) causal generalizations are pro-
jectible too. At least, for an inference to the best explanation we need generalizations that 
can explain their instances. In different conceptions of explanation this is spelled out in dif-
ferent ways, but in any case, not every generalization will be abductively confirmed by its 
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20549 151
The rehabilitation of deductive reasoning
instances. In order to produce explanations, e.g., James Woodward (2003) requires invari-
ant (causal) generalizations, Michael Strevens (2011) in his kairetic account of explanation 
relies on the entanglement of H, and in the Best System Approach of David Lewis only the 
best systematizing generalizations would be explanatory (cf. Lewis, 1994). I will call these 
explaining hypotheses nomic patterns or (lawlike) causal generalizations no matter how we 
will explicate them.
At the very least, these nomic patterns must be more than mere conjunctions of indi-
vidual cases, because for simple conjunctions our conjunction condition requires all con-
juncts to be confirmed individually, since otherwise the conjunction itself would not be 
confirmed genuinely. In order to extrapolate a generalization H, the Fs and Gs should have 
a special connection that we don’t find in a material conditional like ∀x (Fx → Gx). As a 
first approximation, we can think of Woodward’s invariant generalizations as nomic pat-
terns.
In particular, a nomic pattern N = ∀x(Fx  Gx) should have explanatory force and 
describe a causal connection between Fs and Gs that supports counterfactual conditionals 
of the form: if some object or system s would have been F then it would have been G. Fur-
thermore, N should have some stability and show some invariance. The modal aspect of N 
is a part of N’s explanatory power. It shows why an object s that is F has to be G and gives 
us a causal explanation of Gs. This is the case in many circumstances (or possible worlds) 
in which no interfering factors occur. If N applies to many objects and situations it also has 
some unifying force and is not decomposable in two conjuncts that are separately confirm-
able, because both conjuncts are not nomic patterns and, thus, not cautiously and genu-
inely confirmed by our data. A genuine confirmation should demand two things: First, the 
data have to fit the hypothesis and, second, we are justified to assume that the hypothesis, if 
it is true, is a nomic pattern.
Some accounts of laws of nature can explain what is at stake. Dispositional essential-
ism, for example, holds that if N is a law then it describes a natural kind that is charac-
terized by several powers or dispositions that normally bring G about if no antidotes or 
interfering factors were present. It is even part of the identity conditions for F-ness that 
F-objects or F-systems have a tendency to become G as long as no interfering factors pre-
vent that. Thus, if we have a good reason for the assumption that N is lawlike and we have 
observed some instances of N then we also have a good reason to believe that N is valid for 
further non-observed objects. In any case, we have to discuss further the basic problem of 
induction: If we have observed that some objects in a group of objects (e.g. in the extension 
of F) are G we need some special grounds to think that further objects of the group are also 
G. The objects in the group must have some sort of common inclination to be G in order 
for this inference to be licensed.
Of course, the new question is how we can determine whether a generalization is law-
like, and thus projectible, or not. This is a difficult question, but science always looks for 
laws of nature and not for accidental generalizations. We don’t want to know that some 
people (accidentally) recover from an infection after taking substance A, but we always 
want to know whether they recover in a systematic way and because of A, and we want to 
transport this knowledge to new cases. We, therefore, usually look for causal generaliza-
tions in science, and there are special methods (as, e.g., controlled experiments) to check for 
causal connections. Furthermore, we have a lot of background knowledge to decide if an 
observed regularity may be a law of nature or is presumably only pure coincidence. This is 
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a demanding challenge for all empirical sciences independently of our requirement of cau-
tious confirmation. And it demonstrates again that confirmation is a holistic enterprise 
that is not reducible to a simple (syntactical) rule of induction.
If, in a concrete situation, we cannot decide whether our hypothesis H is lawlike, then 
according to cautious confirmation, we presumably cannot extrapolate our data to new 
cases, and the transmission principle cannot be applied. In sum, we face a dilemma: Either 
we stick to the existing theories of confirmation and lose the transmission principle, and 
thereby crucial ways to apply our justified beliefs, or we have to look for the more compli-
cated theories of cautious confirmation that comply with the transmission principle, but 
then we lose the simple conception of confirmation (for example as a probability increase). 
To gain knowledge that can guide our lives we should choose the second option. Further-
more, we can thereby take first steps to solve other paradoxes.
9. Hempel’s Raven Paradox
The material conditional H = ∀x (Fx → Gx) with F = “is a raven” and G = “is black” is 
logically equivalent to its contraposition K = ∀x(¬Gx → ¬Fx). If we then test K accord-
ing to our method of instance confirmation, we have to examine of non-black objects 
whether they are non-ravens. This observation would confirm K according to many stand-
ard confirmation accounts. Or, in the case of metals that expand when heated, we have 
to look for objects that are not expanding. If they are no metal, or were not heated, they 
could also confirm the respective generalization K. Furthermore, these data would also jus-
tify H, since H and K are logically equivalent. But that seems absurd. Some philosophers, 
as Hempel himself, bite the bullet and try to explain that even white objects can confirm 
the raven hypothesis. Bayesians are content with the fact that, with suitable background 
knowledge, the non-Gs that are non-Fs provide us at least with a weaker confirmation of H 
than the Fs that are Gs.
A better first answer to the problem seems to me to examine the modal aspects of law-
like generalizations and cautionary forms of confirmation. If we, e.g., regard our hypothe-
sis H as a modal conditional, like a counterfactual conditional, it is usually not equivalent 
to its contraposition. Thus, the first step in the derivation of the paradox is blocked. Addi-
tionally, in the framework of cautionary confirmation, the contraposition of H is not con-
firmed by its instances, because it obviously is no nomic pattern (and, of course, cannot ex-
plain the data), and the paradox disappears. It seems to be an artifact of the representation 
of H as a material conditional and the simple form of HD-confirmation or instance confir-
mation. If we confine confirmation to its cautious form with nomic patterns, we can avoid 
the paradox.
And, perhaps, there are some further generalizations than just laws of nature that we 
can extrapolate. In the cautionary confirmation account we search for stable nomic pat-
terns in our world by means of their individual instances and only extrapolate observed 
patterns to unobserved situations if we can reasonably assume that the pattern is a (lawlike) 
causal pattern or is, at least, backed up by such a pattern. If we have observed that persons 
with yellow fingers often have developed lung cancer then we can infer that other persons 
with yellow fingers will also develop lung cancer, at least, if we acknowledge the causal pat-
tern (the common cause in this case) in the background. Our smoking behavior causes on 
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the one side yellow fingers and on the other side lung cancer. Therefore, the pattern “yel-
low fingers leads to lung cancer” has a certain stability too and admits some extrapolations, 
although it is not itself a causal generalization. And the corresponding contrapositions 
seem to be no nomic patterns.
Of course, we are more interested in genuine causal connections since they allow us to 
intervene and prevent certain unpleasant events, but some derived patterns are within cer-
tain limits also projectible and apt to make predictions. We may eventually call all these 
generalizations nomic patterns and it is of course a central question of our learning from 
experience which patterns are nomic and how we can detect them. This is a holistic enter-
prise that is well described by inference to the best explanation in the framework of a co-
herentist epistemology.
10. Conclusion
How should we understand “confirmation”? I propose that the transmission principle 
should be part of our confirmation theory, since otherwise our confirmation concept will 
be ineffective. In addition, I try to argue that there are genuine confirmation concepts that 
actually fulfill the transmission principle. However, we must significantly modify our pre-
vious confirmatory theories in the direction of a strategy of greater caution to ensure the 
transmissibility of justification. This, at the same time, allows us to solve other problems 
like the tacking and the raven paradox. However, the cautionary strategy should not go 
so far that no inductive inference is possible at all. Here we have to look for an intelligent 
compromise.
Therefore, I outlined which burdens of proof we have to carry or which background 
knowledge we must have to be able to reason inductively. I think we need certain causal 
or modal assumptions that the empiricist always wanted to avoid. Only lawlike generaliza-
tions are genuinely confirmable, and that complies with the aims of the empirical sciences 
that are concerned with the discovery of natural laws and not with the detection of acci-
dental patterns.
Perhaps, we can find other ways to maintain the TP and still allow for a genuinely in-
ductive reasoning. But it has to be shown how that can be done. In any case, the TP ensures 
that our well-confirmed scientific theories are also applicable. To develop a more precise 
conception of cautious confirmation is a task for further research.
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